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This paper examines how Heidegger’s view that language is poetry provides a 
way of conceptualising religious language.  Poetry, according to Heidegger, is 
language in its purest form, in that it reveals Being, whilst also showing the 
difference between word and thing.  In poetry, Heidegger suggests, we come 
closest to the essence of language itself and encounter its strangeness and 
impermeability.  What would be the implications of viewing religious language 
in this way?  Through examining Heidegger’s view that poetry is the purest 
form of language, I suggest that it would also be possible to view religious 
language as ‘poetry’ in this way, in that it also shows the transcendence of what 
cannot be brought to presence in language, except as concealed.  Such a view of 
religious language leads to the view that it is not a special, unique or distinctive 
category of language, but rather a mode of language that, like poetry, can draw 
our attention to the inarticulable relationship between word and world that 





                            And so each new venture 
Is a new beginning, a raid on the inarticulate 
                                           (Eliot, 1963, p. 203) 
 
Martin Heidegger’s later essays on language state that poetry is language in its 
purest form.  In poetry, according to Heidegger, we come closest to encountering the 
Being of language, which nevertheless remains concealed.  Poetry, for Heidegger, 
reveals the difference between thing and world, thing and word.  The poet listens to 
language, lets language speak and reveal Being.  Poetry is a ‘raid on the inarticulate’ 
in that poetry is original speaking, naming that which has not been named, a bidding 
to come into the clearing created by language.  Poetry reveals this strangeness of 
language, its otherness and its nearness.  In the paper, I will consider how Heidegger’s 
exploration of poetry may lead us to reconsider the ways in which religious language 
has been conceptualized.  Heidegger’s writing on poetry challenges us to consider 
whether the nature of language can be conceptualized at all.  I will suggest that 
Heidegger provides a new way of understanding religious language, and more 
importantly, shows us a way of listening to religious language, so that its nature is 
revealed as hidden and unconceptualizable, yet at the same time providing an opening 
to the wholly Other. 
 
I.  The Nature of Poetry 
 
 Before we can explore the idea of religious language as poetic language, it is 
necessary to provide a sketch of the elements of Heidegger’s writings on the nature of 
poetry.  Heidegger sees poetry as pure, originary language.  But what exactly does he 
mean by ‘poetry’?  Heidegger uses the verbal form Dichten, often translated as 
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poetry, as well as Dichtung, but can we be more specific about what these terms 
mean?  Furniss and Bath (1996) point out that within literary theory there is no 
agreement as to what poetry is.  Neither does Heidegger give us a precise definition of 
what he means by poetry.  It is not limited to verse: ‘Pure prose is never “prosaic.”  It 
is as poetic and hence as rare as poetry’ (PLT, p. 208).  Heidegger suggests that art 
may be subsumed under the category of poetry: 
 
All art, as the letting happen of the advent of the truth, is, as such, 
essentially poetry.  The nature of art … is the setting-itself-into-work of 
truth. (PLT, p. 72) 
 
 Poetry is not seen as an expression of the poet’s views or experiences: ‘In its 
essence, language is neither expression nor an activity of man.’ (PLT, p. 197)  Poetry, 
as pure language, speaks itself: 
 
What is spoken purely is that in which the completion of speaking that is 
proper to what is spoken is, in its turn, an original.  What is spoken purely 
is the poem.  (PLT, p. 194) 
 
We therefore need to listen to the poem itself.  ‘It is language itself and not the 
arbitrary individuality of the poet that really speaks in the poem.’ (Pattison, 2000, p. 
169)  Thus the poem goes beyond the poet’s intention.  The poetic word itself is never 
exhausted, never closed; when opened up by interpretation, there remains a 
hiddenness to the word.  ‘The poetic work speaks out of an ambiguous 
ambiguousness.’ (OWL, p. 192)  This is a fundamental aspect of what poetry means to 
Heidegger. 
 
If we ask, Was heist Dichten? one answer lies in its density or 
impermeability, its earthliness, its resistance to penetration by analysis, its 
uncontainability within grammar, rhetoric, or poetics – its essential 
darkness … its otherness. (Bruns, 1989, p. 4) 
 
We can see this in Heidegger’s treatment of poetry, for example, that of Trakl, 
Hölderlin and George.  We witness a very close exegesis of the language of the poem, 
as he opens the poem up to find new resonances, a new speaking: ‘like an old 
midrashist, he finds matter for thinking in every jot and tittle, every mark or wrinkle 
of the text’ (Bruns, 1989, p. 3). 
 So, for Heidegger, poetry is not merely verse; it speaks independently of the 
poet, and possesses a hiddenness that means that its interpretation is never closed.  
Another key feature of poetry for Heidegger is that, as pure language, it names.  This 
naming is not a designation: ‘This naming does not hand out titles.  It does not apply 
titles, but it calls into the word.  The naming calls.’ (PLT, p. 198)  The naming calls 
what is concealed to come to language as unconcealed.  The role of the poet is to 
name things as they are, to show their Being: 
 
When the gods are named originally and the essence of things finds its 
word, so that things first shine out, human existence is brought into a firm 
relation and set on a ground. (Heidegger quoted in Bernasconi, [1985] 




Bernasconi, in The Question of Language in Heidegger’s History of Being, explores 
how in Heidegger’s later works, Being is instituted in language.  We can see this in 
The Origin of the Work of Art: 
 
Language, by naming beings for the first time, first brings beings to word 
and to appearance.  Only this naming nominates beings to their beings 
from out of their being. (PLT, p. 73) 
 
This idea of poetry as naming / founding / bringing to Being does not mean that the 
poet has the power to create Being, for it is language that speaks.  It articulates and so 
reveals our life-world, but it does not create it.  As Pattison emphasises: 
 
Language is led not only by itself… but by what we apprehend by means 
of our sensory and motor interaction with the world, by what lies beyond 
language and, in a sense, precedes or transcends language. (Pattison, 
2005, p. 146) 
 
Language in this sense as poetry allows things to appear as thing, finds the essence of 
the thing, creates an opening for it to appear. 
 
Poetry … is not an aimless imagining of whimsicalities and not a flight of 
mere notions and fancies into the realm of the unreal.  What poetry, as 
illuminating projection, unfolds of unconcealedness and projects ahead 
into the design of the figure, is the Open which poetry lets happen, and 
indeed in such a way that only now, in the midst of beings, the Open 
brings beings to shine and ring out. (PLT, p. 72) 
 
 Poetry, pure language, as Naming is also termed Saying.  In The Origin of the 
Work of Art, Heidegger sees poetry as fundamental Naming / Saying in that it can 
speak that which is unspoken: 
 
Projective saying is poetry … Poetry is the saying of the unconcealedness 
of what is … Projective saying is saying which, in preparing the sayable, 
simultaneously brings the unsayable as such into a world. (PLT, p. 74, 
italics mine) 
 
This is why poetry is language in its purest form.  It shows the unsayable as such, 
revealing it as other than the word, or not already ready for language.  Yet poetry 
speaks; thus the unsayable, while revealed in its being as unsayable, preserves a 
hiddenness.  The unsayable can never be fully brought to language; something of its 
otherness always remains untapped. 
 This is one type of difference revealed in poetry: the difference between word 
and thing.  The term ‘dif-ference’ is left open by Heidegger.  Bruns suggests that ‘dif-
ference’ can be understood as all of the following: diaphora, Ereignis, dimension, 
pain, Riss.  ‘The effort to say what dif-ference is, exactly, is misguided, or at all 
events doomed to fail.’ (1989, p. 90)  In Language, Heidegger explores the dif-
ference between world and thing, and presents the dif-ference as what bids, stills, calls 
into presence, and holds apart in intimacy.  It is language that establishes this dif-
ference: ‘Language, the peal of stillness, is, inasmuch as the dif-ference takes place.  
Language goes on as the taking place or occurring of the dif-ference for world and 
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things.’ (PLT, p. 207)  For Heidegger, this stillness can be heard by listening, and 
poetry calls us to listen to this stillness, which reveals thing as thing, world as world, 
and the intimacy between the two.  But ‘[t]he peal of stillness is not anything human’ 
(p. 207).  It is other than us and other than that which it names.  Saying reveals the 
dif-ference between world and thing and between itself and world. 
 It is because of this tension, this ambiguity in the relation between thing and 
word, that poetry allows us to experience language in its purest form.  Bruns 
eloquently highlights this feature of Heidegger’s theory in Heidegger’s 
Estrangements.  We cannot escape language to say what its essence is.  This is the 
subject of Heidegger’s lecture The Nature of Language.  There we read: 
 
We speak and speak about language.  What we speak of, language, is 
always ahead of us.  Our speaking merely follows language constantly.  
Thus we are continually lagging behind what we first ought to have 
overtaken and taken up in order to speak about it.  Accordingly, when we 
speak of language we remain entangled in a speaking that is persistently 
inadequate.  (OWL, p. 75) 
 
So we can speak about language, but we cannot pin it down to a system of signs or 
meanings, as its essence, its relation to things and world, is ever elusive, veiled.  
Attempts to conceptualize the relationship between word and thing arise from the 
misguided assumption that word and thing fit together in a definite relation that we 
can grasp.  In reality, the word is something mysterious.  This essence, as mysterious, 
and the mysterious relationship between word and thing, Saying and Being, is shown 
in poetry. 
 
Saying and Being, word and thing, belong to each other in a veiled way, a 
way which has hardly been thought of and is not to be thought out to the 
end.  All essential Saying hearkens back to this veiled mutual belonging 
of Saying and Being, word and thing. (OWL, p. 155-156) 
 
Heidegger does not present his case through logical argument.  Bruns defends his 
method thus:  
 
In order to avoid speaking about language (conceptualizing it), and also in 
order not to avoid speaking about it (‘We must incessantly strive to do 
so’), … Heidegger appropriates the discursive secrecy proper to ancient 
theories of wisdom, where it is said that one can speak of the highest (of 
anything) by not speaking, that is, by speaking strangely or in strange 
tongues or by exploiting in radical and even shocking ways the ‘weakness 
of the logos’. (1989, pp. 55-56) 
 
In his essays Words and The Nature of Language, Heidegger reaches his conclusions 
on the nature of language through his meditations on the poem The Word, by Stefan 
George.  Heidegger listens to the poem as saying that there is no word for the word, 
and explores what this might mean.  The absence of the word, does not mean that 
George or Heidegger remain silent: they continue to speak to expose the strangeness 




The renunciation that the poet learns arises from his entrance into the 
realm of the unsayable … Nevertheless the poet is not silent in 
consequence.  He still writes the poem and in it tells us that he learned 
something from what had happened.  He did not learn about language; the 
poet is not a philosopher of language.  He learns to speak differently. 
([1985] 1989, p. 53) 
 
 Heidegger’s challenge then is to speak differently, which in fact means to 
listen differently, to hear language speaking.  Through poetry, it is language that 
speaks: Die Sprache spricht.  In listening to language, things appear as things.  In 
their naming, they come to the clearing created for them by language.  Language 
allows beings to become what they are.  It both frames and founds Being: 
 
The poet names the gods and names all things as what they are.  This 
naming does not consist in supplying with a name something already 
known, but, in that the poet speaks the essential word, the being is first 
named to what it is through this naming.  Thus it becomes known as a 
being.  Poetry is the founding of Being through words. (Heidegger quoted 
in Halliburton, 1981, p. 84) 
 
The poet is the one who is gifted in being able to listen to language.  The poet, as the 
one who receives revelation, is called forth to witness to truth.  Heidegger’s quasi-
biblical tone is apt.  Truth, in Heidegger’s view, is an unconcealment.  Heidegger 
draws on the original Greek word for truth, alētheia, taking the a- as a negative prefix 
and drawing attention to the central root of the word in the term lath: ‘to be 
concealed.’  Pattison suggests how this notion of truth as unconcealment presents ‘the 
world as shining forth in its own natural luminosity’ (2005, p. 73), and this 
unconcealment in both the Greek and Heidegger’s views takes place through 
language: 
 
The primary medium of truth was, for them [the Greek philosophers], 
language, logos, itself.  Language was not then experienced as an 
instrument, an ensemble of purely conventional signs that could be ‘used’ 
to describe things or express thoughts.  Language was itself the 
illuminating power (p.73). 
 
It is, therefore, through listening to the speaking of language, as Heidegger suggests, 
that we can see the world shine forth in this way, whilst also revealing its hiddeness. 
My outline of Heidegger’s conception of poetic language has been necessarily 
brief, and I have chosen to focus on those aspects that I believe are most illuminating 
for an understanding of religious language.  It would be useful to explore further 
Heidegger’s concept of the fourfold, and the relationship between Being, the Holy and 
Language, but that is beyond the scope of this paper.  Let us now examine how far 
religious language might usefully be understood within the new way of seeing 
language presented by Heidegger. 
 
II. Religious Language as Saying 
 
 There is not scope within this paper to provide an overview of the different 
theories of religious language that have been entertained since the twentieth century.  
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What I wish to focus on are the specific aspects of Heidegger’s understanding of 
poetry which bring a distinctive voice to the ongoing dialogue on the nature of 
religious language.  Although professing himself neither theist nor atheist, 
Heidegger’s later writings do refer to ‘the gods’ and ‘God’ in relation to poetry, for 
example his essay on Rilke.  The poet, in hinting at the presence of a deity, reveals 
their absence.  David White points out that Heidegger’s language may be seen as 
problematic for theology, for example his ‘apparently random references to “God” … 
and “the gods”.’ (1978, p. 122).  To explore Heidegger’s own theology is beyond the 
scope of this paper, and I wish, moreover, to focus on his conception of poetic 
language and what this might mean for the study of religious language, irrespective of 
Heidegger’s theology.  The most likely reason, I believe, for the neglect of 
Heidegger’s views on language in the study of religious language has been because of 
the desire in theology to say something concrete about the relation between words and 
the Holy, to pin down the nature of religious language.  Implicit has often been the 
desire to defend theological discourse against claims of meaninglessness stemming 
from the discourses of logical positivism.  An example of such a concern can be seen 
in the work of Janet Martin Soskice on religious language: 
 
The theist can coherently claim that his language is referential … The 
theist can reasonably take his talk of God, bound as it is within a wheel of 
images, as being reality depicting, while at the same time acknowledging 
its inadequacy as description.  This, we believe, is the position a critical 
theological realist must take. (Soskice, [1985] 1989, p. 141) 
 
In order to engage in the debate on the nature of religious language, we need to take 
seriously the challenge Heidegger poses, that we won’t be able to conceptualize it, 
putting aside concerns about the challenge this might present to the rationality of 
discourse about the nature of God. 
 So, can we see religious language as poetry, as pure language?  If we return to 
Heidegger’s conception of poetry, we saw that it was not limited to poesy, that all art 
was in essence poetry.  Therefore we do not have a problem with locating religious 
language in its form within poetry.  Heidegger writes: 
 
Poetry proper is never merely a higher mode (melos) of everyday 
language.  It is rather the reverse: everyday language is a forgotten and 
therefore used-up poem, from which there hardly resounds a call any 
longer. (PLT, p. 208) 
 
Religious language therefore needs to discover its essence as poetic for us to hear it 
speaking, to prevent it from becoming dull, ‘used-up’.  The idea that religious 
language is poetic is not new.  Austin Farrer (1972), for example, explored the nature 
of religious language as poetry and thus as metaphor.  Levinas has also touched on the 
nature of religious language as poetic: 
 
What the multiple expressions of religious language have in common is 
the claim to be inexhaustible in references to the world from which the 
signification of words, propositions and discourses is woven.  How do we 
open to language the borders of the given reality in which we live? … In 
the poetic imagination, the unheard can be heard, called out to and 
  
7 
expressed … metaphor can lead beyond the experiences which seem to 
have created it (Levinas, [1982] 1994, p. 86) 
 
Such theories are helpful in that they demonstrate the open-endedness of religious 
language.  There are however two problems with such conceptions of religious 
language as poetry.  The first is that these traditional positions tend to assume that all 
religious language is metaphorical or figurative.  This is mistaken in its attempt to 
ground poetry in what eludes us: a theory of the nature of language.  Heidegger’s 
view of poetry leads us away from this.  As Bruns writes: 
 
Heidegger means to cure us of this addiction to theories of meaning and 
signification, but it is still too early for him to succeed. … [T]he whole 
purpose of ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ is to emancipate us from the 
traditional language of figurality.  A theory of metaphor is precisely what 
we no longer need in order to reflect on the otherness of the work of art. 
(1989, pp. 41-42) 
 
The second way in which previous conceptions of religious language as poetry have 
been misguided is that they assume that religious language belongs in a special 
category of language as an attempt to speak at the limits of language.  This view is 
problematic because it rests on the assumption that ‘everyday’ language operates as 
straightforward signification, word signifying thing or idea of thing.  On this view, 
religious language is problematic because the signified is absent, or not at all obvious.  
Therefore it needs to be seen as different, ‘poetic’ rather than ‘prosaic’, placed within 
its own language game.  It we reject this view and follow Heidegger, we see that 
religious language is not different from other language, but rather the very essence of 
language itself, as words reveal their very opacity and thereby reveal what is 
otherwise concealed. 
 So, we can see religious language as poetry, but not as it has usually been 
conceptualized, as thereby necessarily metaphorical or symbolic.  If we could learn to 
see religious language as poetry according to Heidegger, we would not treat it as a 
special category of language, but as itself pure language.  Heidegger might be 
criticised on the grounds that he does not prove his case or argue for the primacy of 
poetry.  But he has, in poetry, found a crack in theories of word / object relation, and 
through this crack he has opened up a space for wonder in which the essence of 
language itself is revealed as mysterious whilst also revealing the transcendent as 
such.  Thus Heidegger draws attention to how language brings to presence what 
cannot be brought to presence, the excess that remains beyond the limits of language.   
 Another key area of Heidegger’s views on poetry that has implications for 
religious language is his view that it is language, not man, who speaks.  ‘Language 
speaks.  Man speaks in that he responds to language.’ (PLT, p. 210)  John Macquarrie 
(1967) points out the parallels between Heidegger’s view of poetry and the concept of 
revelation, both regarding the word which reveals truth as a gift to the poet / prophet.  
Macquarrie thinks it is a mistake to see Heidegger as presenting the poet as the 
passive receptor who only acts as a channel for language.  In many ways, however, 
this is precisely what Heidegger is saying: the poet listens for the voice of Being.  In 
religious language, this could be a dangerous view, since many things that are spoken 
in the name of religion are false, and it is perhaps a failing of Heidegger’s theory that 
it does not account for this.  What is important for religious language though is the 
idea that language, the work, speaks, and we need to listen to it.  Whilst it is important 
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in trying to understand religious language, particularly scripture, to explore its 
historical context and authorial intention, we must not think that we have ever reached 
a definitive interpretation.  The word, ‘living and active’, needs to be allowed to 
speak, not closed down to what the author wanted to say at a particular time. 
 Another way in which religious language can be seen as inhabiting the domain 
of poetry is that it continues to speak of that which is elusive.  Heidegger speaks of 
the poet as the one who names the holy.  ‘Holy’ literally means ‘set apart’1; the poet, 
naming the Holy, names what is Other.  The poet, in bidding dif-ference, allows the 
Holy to emerge as Other.  It hints at the unsayable while revealing it as such. 
 
[P]oetry is … veiled, a sign rather than a statement.  Playing on the double 
meaning of the German ‘Wink’, which means both ‘hint’ and ‘wave’ …, 
Heidegger says that such a hint / wave is ‘a holding on to a closeness in 
the course of increasing distance and, conversely, the revealing of the 
distance still to be covered in the joyful proximity of the one arriving.’ 
(Pattison, 2000, p. 171). 
 
Poetry reveals the depths of the hiddenness of the one it names in the process of 
revelation.  ‘[T]he god who remains unknown, must by showing himself as the one he 
is, appear as the one who remains unknown.  God’s manifestness … is mysterious.’ 
(OWL, p. 220)  This intimacy between hiddenness and revelation is the essence of 
religious language.  Religious language reveals the Holy as ever beyond us, whilst at 
the same time revealing its nearness.  It is precisely in language itself that the 
revelation of God as Other occurs.  As Walter Benjamin writes, in scripture, 
‘language and revelation are without any tension.’ ([1955] 1992, p. 82) We may also 
speak of ritual and ceremony as types of poetry in that they also reveal God as Other, 
and in themselves point away from themselves.  All these types of religious language 
are pure language in that they show the otherness of Being from language, the 
distance, the veiled relation, between Saying and Being. 
 Thus seeing religious language as poetic helps us to realise the rift between 
word and thing, but encourages us to go on speaking in order to bring the Holy as 
concealed to presence.  As Graham Ward writes, religious language is: ‘both 
necessary and performs its own deconstruction … It is necessary because … the Word 
of God is not immediately present to us.  What is present to us … is the absence of 
immediacy’ (1995: 153).  The role of poetic language is to bring to presence that 
which is otherwise hidden from us.  Religious language is thus a new speaking, a 
calling, an originary naming. 
 Heidegger’s view of poetry encourages us to see language as opening the Holy 
in its otherness. 
 
The poet calls, in the sights of the sky, that which in its very self-
disclosure causes the appearance of that which conceals itself, and indeed 
as that which conceals itself.  In the familiar appearance, the poet calls the 
alien as that to which the invisible imparts itself in order to remain what it 
is – unknown. (Heidegger quoted in Bruns, 1989, p. 185) 
 
Heidegger therefore sees the concealed Other as coming to presence in language.  Can 
we say how this takes place?  We have already seen that for Heidegger the 
                                                
1 Heidegger uses the term almost synonymously with ‘Being’, cf. Halliburton, 1981, p. 95 
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relationship between Saying and Being is veiled, so can we explore how the 
concealed is unconcealed in language?  Benjamin provides a hint as to how we might 
understand the process of unconcealment: ‘All language communicates himself.’ 
(cited in Ward, 1995, p. 3)  It is by listening to language and hearing its very 
materiality and strangeness that the gap between thing and word emerges, and the 
thing emerges as thing.  Language itself remains other, ‘language flatly refuses to 
express itself in words’ (OWL, p. 81), and thus conceals itself, remains dark and 
mysterious.  Bruns writes: 
 
The task of exegesis is not to eliminate darkness or enigma but to enter into it 
and abide with it, because illumination always occurs within darkness, not in 
opposition to it … The darkness of poetry is not a defect of its language but the 
essence of it. (1989, p. 40) 
 
This then is perhaps how religious language presences the Holy, through its darkness 
and opacity.  We do not see clearly through language, rather we dwell in it.  This idea 
of religious language as dark is seen clearly in the study of parables.  The Hebrew 
term mashal which is translated as ‘parable’ can equally be translated as ‘riddle’ or 
‘dark saying’.  These ‘riddles’ are presented as a means of revelation, for example in 
Matthew 13:35: 
 
I will open my mouth in parables, 
I will utter things hidden since 
The creation of the world. 
 
Parables hide in order to reveal.  Frank Kermode writes: ‘Parable, it seems, may 
proclaim a truth as a herald does, and at the same time conceal truth like an oracle.’ 
(1979, p. 47)  This simultaneous proclamation and concealment is what Heidegger 
claims for poetry.  Thus religious language can be seen as pure language in that it 
eludes us, while bringing to presence that which is Other as such. 
 
III. Some possible objections 
 
 Before drawing this paper to a close, it is worth pausing to consider some of 
the objections that could be raised against viewing religious language as poetic in this 
Heideggerian sense.   
 The first challenge is whether Heidegger so stresses the incomprehensibility of 
the Other, that, by the Leibnizian principle of the ‘identity of indiscernables,’ it slips 
past transcendence and into some brand of irrationality, close to Nietzsche’s ‘Will’.  
This relates not just to Heidegger’s emphasis on the incomprehensibility of the Holy, 
but also to his notion of truth as unconcealment: it is possible to see how his view of 
truth as unconcealment might be interpreted as leading to a total relativisation of the 
question of truth.  Pattison explains this interpretation of Heidegger and its similarity 
to Nietzsche as follows: 
 
this might be read as saying that all views are equally true, that, in effect, 
‘view’ = ‘true view’, so that, in fact, no real distinction between true and 
false is possible any more.  Instead, how we see ourselves comes to 
depend on some kind of arbitrarily willed choice.  ‘I willed it thus!’ is 
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra’s answer to the question concerning the continuity 
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and coherence of the self… Is Heidegger himself doing more than giving 
a cloak of philosophical formality to Nietzsche’s renowned 
perspectivism? (2005, p. 163)   
 
It must be acknowledged that Heidegger’s emphasis on the ultimate 
incomprehensibility of what is brought to presence in language as concealed could be 
interpreted in this way.  It must also be stated that speaking about God in this way 
could not be reduced to any kind of project or managed system of knowledge.  And 
yet this approach to the real, although at the perimeter of knowledge, must be seen as 
part of the activity of discourse, through its being spoken as an address from one 
person to another.2  
In order to develop this idea of language as part of the activity of discourse, as 
a corrective against the view that a Heideggerian approach to religious language leads 
to irrationality, let us turn to a significant critic of Heidegger: Levinas. It is beyond 
the scope of this essay to examine the somewhat oedipal relationship between the 
phenomenology of Levinas and that of Heidegger, and it has already been well 
documented.  If we consider their approaches to the nature of language, we might see 
Levinas as highlighting the fact that Heidegger does not draw enough emphasis to the 
idea of language as part of the activity of discourse, or conversation.   
There are both strong parallels and points of departure between Levinas and 
Heidegger’s views of language.  For both, to be human is to have language, and we 
can see Levinas taking up Heidegger’s phraseology in his interpretation of this idea in 
‘Meaning and Sense’: ‘There never was a moment in which meaning first came to 
birth out of a meaningless being, outside of a historical position where language is 
spoken.  And that is doubtless what was meant when we were taught that language is 
the house of being.’ (Levinas, 1996, p. 38)  We can also see the influence of 
Heidegger when Levinas describes language in its expressive function as poetry: 
‘Language qua expression is, above all, the creative language of poetry’ (p. 41).  Both 
Levinas and Heidegger emphasise that the unsayable is brought to presence as 
unsayable through language.  In Totality and Infinity, Levinas states that ‘The 
signified is never a complete presence; always a sign in its turn, it does not come in a 
straightforward frankness.’ (Levinas, [1969] 2004, p. 96) However, although Levinas 
states here that what is signified is in some sense both present and absent in the 
process of signification, there is rather a different emphasis on the unsayable in 
Levinas compared to Heidegger.  Levinas’s concern is to show that the signifier, the 
Other, the one who addresses me is beyond language, as the forever inaccessible 
origin of language.  This we can see clearly in ‘Meaning and Sense’: 
 
The Other (Autrui) who faces me is not included in the totality of being 
expressed.  He arises behind every assembling of being as he to whom I 
express what I express.  I find myself facing the Other (Autrui).  He is 
neither a cultural signification nor a simple given.  He is sense 
primordially, for he gives sense to expression itself, for it is only by him 
that a phenomenon as a meaning is, of itself, introduced into being. 
(Levinas, 1996, p. 52) 
 
                                                
2 See Cristina Lafont’s Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure (2000) for a very rigorous 
examination of how Heidegger’s approach to language is a form of meaning holism, drawing on 
Putnam in order to show similarities between both their approaches to language. 
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The term sens used in the statement that the Other is ‘sense primordially’ can be 
translated as both ‘meaning’ and ‘direction’.  Thus the Other while bringing me 
meaning is also my direction, as I am always in movement towards the Other, 
oriented towards the Other.  And as I turn in this direction of the Other who always 
escapes me, my world is always unfolding and being given new meanings. For 
Heidegger, the emphasis is less on the signifier who lies beyond signification or 
expression, situated at the opening of signification and meaning, than on the 
simultaneous absence and presence of the signified.3  While Heidegger leads us to 
consider the nature of language itself as beyond conceptualisation, Levinas shows us 
how language is invested with meaning by the fact that it is spoken by one who is 
vulnerable to my response to that speaking.  Thus while Heidegger emphasises that it 
is language that speaks in the speaker, or the poet, for Levinas, this speaking is 
inextricably bound up with the offering of the word by the Other, the interpellation of 
the Other.  It is not that Levinas would necessarily disagree that it is language that 
speaks in the Other or in me.  Indeed language as brought to me from outside myself, 
by the Other, suggests that in a sense language does ‘possess’ me.  Nevertheless, 
Levinas’s emphasis on the Other speaking, and the fact that it is the Other speaking to 
me that founds my world and my meanings and a common world of objects and 
objectivity shows the ethical nature of language in a way that is different from 
Heidegger’s concern to show the unsayableness of the relation between Saying and 
Being, the veiled relation between word and thing. John Llewelyn summarises the 
difference between them thus: 
 
Prior to my being possessed by language, Levinas maintains, is my 
possession by the human being who speaks to me…. For both Heidegger 
and Levinas [sociality] is linguistic, and a way of being possessed by 
language.  But, to repeat, whereas for Heidegger possession by language 
is a way of being with others, for Levinas it is also a possession by others.  
This latter possession disrupts my being possessed by language as this is 
understood by Heidegger. (2002, p. 123) 
 
Ultimately, Levinas’s philosophy of language, like Heidegger’s, suggests that 
language is the ‘house of being’, but for Levinas, this being is always founded in an 
orientation and desire for the Other who addresses me and thus founds language, and 
this particular ethical orientation is not present in Heidegger’s discussion of language.  
Even the use of the term ‘house of being’ by Heidegger emphasises this difference: in 
language, for Heidegger, I dwell poetically.  For Levinas, my abode as a subject is a 
tent rather than a house as I do not dwell but rather move always towards the Other.  
Although Levinas is in many ways critical of Heidegger, perhaps, ultimately, it is 
possible to treat their approaches to language as complementary rather than in 
competition.  While Heidegger draws attention to the unsayableness of the world, and 
the impossibility of stepping outside of language to be able to give a full account of 
the nature of language, Levinas’s approach allows us to add to this discourse by 
seeing that language comes from our condition of being addressed by others, itself a 
condition of responsibility that lies beyond representation in language.  It is because 
of my prior receptivity and responsibility to the address of the Other, that I can have 
language at all.  For Levinas, the opening of language is the Other’s address to me.  
All language, objectivity and truth are made possible by the Other’s teaching, which 
                                                
3 Although Heidegger does not use the terms ‘signifed’ or ‘signification’ to describe these ideas 
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manifests infinity, bringing me more than I contain.  It is only through the 
interpellation of the Other and my response that commonality and community are 
founded.  Thus perhaps we could interpret Heidegger’s approach through a 
Levinasian lens: language may be unthematizable, but the activity of speaking means 
that we can see language as following from the address by the Other, and thus the 
world is founded in common, and it is this idea of language as discourse that could 
prevent Heidegger’s approach from slipping past transcendence into irrationality.  
Language as discursive means that speech is a public act and therefore the way we 
speak about God and understand religious language is submitted to discursive rules, 
just as any other form of language is.  Pattison explains this idea of speaking and 
interpreting as a shared task within his interpretation of religious language as a 
subjunctive mode of speech: 
 
The hermeneutic task is public and dialogical through-and-through, right 
from the beginning all the way down.  If the filter of parataxis allows the 
essential brokenness of religious language to come to expression in, with 
and under the medium of subjunctivity, dialogue points to the 
responsibility we have, in speaking, for what we say, for the one (or for 
those) to whom we say it and for ourselves in saying it… [D]ialogue, 
speech, talk, conversation (‘turning things round together’), is the way in 
which we first learn to speak – about anything, and here, particularly 
about God.  The words we use are not some kind of personal possession 
we can take out and spend according to a fixed rate.  (2005, p. 144) 
 
Thus seeing language as an activity of discourse, conversation, an address, as 
emphasised by Levinas and Pattison, shows that we have responsibility for what we 
say, a point that perhaps Heidegger neglects to draw attention to.  What we can say 
about God is always determined by this condition of responsibility, as Levinas 
emphasises. Thus language is a gift from outside and human subjectivity is only 
possible through this gift of language that reveals the world and the Holy as beyond 
the word yet brought to presence through the word.  
 A further criticism that might be raised, which has previously been levelled 
against other apophatic theologies, is whether Heidegger’s approach to language 
makes talk about God meaningless or might incline towards atheism.  Heidegger’s 
approach to language might be seen as typical, in some ways, of the via negativa, 
given that within his notion of language as poetry, the word reveals the dif-ference 
between word and thing, and reveals what cannot be brought to language.  Pattison 
points out that from the standpoint of ecclesiastical theology, negative theology and 
its associated mystical traditions ‘cannot but be suspect, as they seem to imperil 
certain key affirmations about God that Christian theologians want to insist on’ (2005, 
p. 128), such as that God loves us, God exists.  This has led many to see negative 
theologies as a type of atheism.  As Pattison writes: 
 
From a certain angle of vision radical apophatism and atheism seem 
scarcely distinguishable…. Once the claims of transcendence are raised to 
such heights, isn’t everything that can be said equally valid and equally 
worthless?  Might we not just as well speak of God by speaking about 




While it is possible to place a greater emphasis on the notion of poetic language as a 
form of discourse, as suggested above, to answer the accusation that Heidegger’s 
approach would lead to a meaningless irrationality, it must be admitted that 
Heidegger’s approach does present a challenge to orthodox theological and 
philosophical attempts to affirm certain attributes of God.  If we are to approach 
religious language as poetic in the Heideggerian sense, then there will always be 
certain indeterminacy of meaning and this does lead to an approach to the divine as 
irreducible to a certain type of conceptual thinking.  Pattison articulates this well: 
 
This [approach] allows for and even insists on a certain inbuilt 
imprecision, since thinking about God is not, simply, thinking God, that is 
to say, it is not a mental event that that can be imagined as simply and 
unproblematically transparent to its object.  It is not a straightforward 
cognitive act (p.243). 
 
Many might feel uncomfortable with such an approach and it certainly falls 
short of what many philosophical theists would view as the fullness of the concept of 
God.  However, if we do regard religious language as poetic, it does not follow that 
the concept of God is devoid of content, or that we can attach meanings or words as 
we choose.  Tristan Moyle suggests that there is a certain necessity to the process of 
speaking in Heidegger’s view: 
 
This movement of language is not arbitrary or haphazard.  The giving of 
Being orders and binds (‘appropriates’) man in its giving: it has the force 
of necessity.  Hence the movement by which language ‘speaks’ possesses 
within itself an essential element of necessity or purpose.  A movement is 
purposeful if it appears to follow rules.  A movement without 
purposefulness or rules is meaningless.  (2005, p. 64) 
 
Thus what we can and cannot say about God is no wilful creation but determined by 
rules of community and the movement of Being that orders what can be said.  And 
furthermore, it should be emphasised that according to Heidegger, all language, and 
not just religious language, could be seen as in essence poetic.  So religious language 
is not a particular type very imprecise language: all language bears the trace of what 
cannot be said or thought. 
 Having paused to consider these objections to a Heideggerian approach to 




The assertion of God’s hiddenness (which includes God’s invisibility, 
incomprehensibility and ineffability) tells us that God does not belong to 
the objects which we can always subjugate to the process of our viewing, 
conceiving and expressing. (Barth, 1957, p. 187) 
 
If we conceive of religious language as poetry according to Heidegger, then religious 
language both reveals God’s hiddenness and brings the Holy to presence.  This takes 
place, as Barth says, by showing that the Holy does not belong to words / objects 
which we view.  We are not the subjects of the process.  Rather ‘the Holy (Being) 
addresses the poet’ (Richardson, 1963, p. 472).  It is Being which announces itself, as 
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coming to unconcealment in language, showing its simultaneous concealment, and 
showing that it will return to concealment.  The challenge that Heidegger presents for 
religious language is to consider that we might not be able to conceptualize what the 
nature of religious language is.  Its nature is veiled.  But that does not mean we cannot 
talk about it and contemplate it.  It is revealed as ‘beyond the horizon of intelligible 
representation – silent, mysterious, perhaps divine.’ (Gall, 1987, p. 120) 
 Heidegger’s writing on poetry exposes the fault line of all language.  Theology 
should not see religious language as a special case, but rather as poetry, language in 
its purest form, precisely where the fault line is revealed.  Heidegger shows us, as St 
Paul writes, that ‘now we see in part’, as ‘through a glass darkly’.  As poetry reveals 
hiddenness in openness, so, as Barth writes, we are always ‘on the way’ to revelation: 
even as it occurs, or remains future (Ward 1995). 
 Religious language as poetry may be called a ‘raid on the inarticulate’ in that 
is speaks the unsayable, and brings it to presence as such.  Man is ‘he who walks the 
boundaries of the boundless’ (OWL, p. 41).  In religious language, as poetry, the word 
is stretched, made strange, and it is in recognising this that revelation takes place.  
Paul Van Buren writes that ‘Religion arises from experiences of what surpasses 
language’ (1972, p. 62).  I believe that we can challenge the use of the word ‘surpass’, 
and instead say that poetry, language itself, may reveal that experience of otherness 
found in religion and bring it to presence as concealed and unconcealed, present and 
absent.  As Heidegger paradoxically challenges our understanding: 
 
The default of God and the divinities is absence.  But absence is not 
nothing; rather it is precisely the presence, which must first be 
appropriated, of the hidden fullness of what has been, and what, thus 
gathered, is presencing … This no-longer is in itself a not-yet of the veiled 
arrival of its inexhaustible nature. (PLT, p. 184) 
 
In coming to recognise religious language as poetry, in listening to language speaking, 
we may draw nearer to the mystery of the Holy.  The challenge of such an approach, 
is to receive that hidden fullness as a gift and continue the Saying, to one another 
within community and thus allow speech to reveal again the mystery of the 
transcendent and to give that gift to others.  The task of thinking about God in such a 
way is to recognise what has been covered over in the age of technology and 
recognise the world as a space for wonder.  This is an ethical challenge: 
 
For the most part, we fail to experience the world as our experience of 
Being; the world makes no claim upon us, nor do we recognise our living 
bond with it.  However, the work of thought – ontology – re-shapes and 
re-orders the content of decaying nature; thinking offers a variation on the 
limit rhythm gives, opening up new and surprising forms of experience.  
As such, the labour of thought allows us to reclaim the world we have 
lost, to recognise in the alienated other the outline of a gift we have been 
given.  In order to receive appropriately the gift of the world we must 
return the gift.  (Moyle, 2005, p. 132) 
 
To speak of God in this way is to pass this gift of revelation on to others.  Speaking 
and thinking about God not only draws us closer to the Holy, but might also renew the 
bonds of community and show the presence of the transcendent as immanent within 
every address of I to an other.  In the task of speaking about and thus revealing God, 
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the possibility is always present of building a space for us to dwell poetically and 
thereby a place for a community to gather and flourish.    
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Abbreviations used in the text 
 
PLT  Poetry, Language, Thought 
 
OWL  On The Way to Language 
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